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“Chaos is a ladder.”
(George R. R. Martin, A Game of Thrones)
Last December, the Hungarian legislator adopted a rule that allows non-EU-resident
Hungarian citizens to vote at the European Parliament elections. The law specifically
refers to Council decision 2018/994 amending the Act concerning the election of
the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, adopted
last summer. The new Article 9a allows Member States to grant their citizens
residing outside the EU the right to vote, in line with their national electoral rules.
Implementation done, EU conformity secured, nothing to see here. Or is there? This
post illustrates how the hidden assumption of normality behind EU regulations can
end up legitimizing illiberal moves.
Hungary, like a good number of states in the region, has kin-minorities in neighboring
states. In the case of Hungary, this is the result of the post-war peace treaties. The
government, also not unlike many other states, opted to grant easy access to its kin-
minorities, giving up on the otherwise very stringent residency requirements (eight
years, practically even more for most non-EU citizens). This effectively expanded the
citizenry, gaining over one million new citizens, for a country of less than ten million.
There was a virtual consensus in the ‘90s, which included the presently governing
party FIDESZ, that non-resident citizenship contradicts nation-building policy goals,
among others, because, according to fears at the time, that could have triggered
mass exodus.
By the mid-2000s, after a failed referendum on the issue, citizenship without voting
rights (‘dual citizenship’ in the Hungarian debate) became an important right-wing
issue, embodying the program to ‘unite the nation across borders’, sometimes
with irredentist overtones. As FIDESZ came to power in 2010, the Hungarian
Parliament adopted the amendment of the Nationality Act that allowed for non-
resident naturalization, followed by granting voting rights a year later. While this
proved to be more controversial (according to a poll at that time, 77 per cent of
Hungarian voters did not approve an extension of voting rights), it effectively resulted
in the addition of a loyal, for grateful, voting base to the governing party.
Counterarguments included diverse concerns ranging from melting Hungarian
communities (which apparently has been happening regardless of citizenship
policies), through political consequences (new non-resident voters thanking
Orbán for citizenship) and the connection between taxation and public services to
worsening bilateral relations with neighboring countries (which varied from a tit-
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for-tat reaction in Slovakia and hostility in Ukraine to Romania’s and Serbia’s more
permissive stance).
Normative arguments point out the malleability of old boundaries in a globalizing
world, with Europeanization and virtualizing borders, but also the importance of
maintaining meaningful political communities. Rainer Bauböck has proposed to treat
‘stakeholders’ as citizens while others are legitimately excluded from the citizenry.
We should then decide if new Hungarian voters are ‘stakeholders’ who have an
interest in the decisions and the future of Hungary. Under this standard, it does
not suffice that many who naturalize translate this move as a long due recognition
of their being Hungarian (an emotional aspect voiced mostly by the elderly) or
that many value the resulting mobility (mostly younger citizens from Ukraine and
Serbia).1)Szabolcs Pogonyi, The passport as means of identity management:
making and unmaking ethnic boundaries through citizenship, Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440493. Also see
Chart 5.5 Pragmatic/identitarian citizenship perceptions by age in Szabolcs Pogonyi,
Extra-Territorial Ethnic Politics, Discourses and Identities in Hungary, Palgrave,
2017, 176.  ‘Stakes’ can mean taxes, but you can be a citizen without paying taxes;
it can also mean being part of the Habermasian public sphere, and in fact many of
the new citizens have been following Hungarian news for long (see, e.g., the figures
on pages 37 and 46 here), many for sure are more knowledgeable about Hungarian
politics than the average living in Hungary.
The Hungarian illiberal regime also expanded its political influence, transferring
huge sums (according to one approximation, based on the calculations by Nándor
Bárdi, this is around € 362 M for 2017) and building loyalty networks that can trump
local democratic processes. Clientelism and financial support also results in the
retuning of Hungarian-language media to voicing the political messages of FIDESZ.
This self-reinforcing circle means that ‘stakes’ do cross borders. Yet, we do not
have to invoke the example of Erdo#an on the trail in Western Europe to note the
oddity of campaigning in foreign countries, and the campaign promises that this
can entail. We now have two consecutive elections (and one referendum) with non-
resident votes that show that more than 96 per cent of these new votes went for
FIDESZ. In 2014, these helped FIDESZ in achieving the constitution-amending
supermajority. However, external votes did not play a role in the outcome of the 2018
elections, partly due to other illiberal elements of the electoral system, above all,
the ‘compensation’ after winning candidates. The virtualization of borders results
in strengthening ethnic boundaries (as well as the exportation of illiberalism), and
the chances for government change, a key condition of democracy, are further
decreasing in Hungary. Furthermore, with dual citizens being able to vote in two
countries, the Hungarian government tries to make sure that illiberal votes count at
both places: in Serbia, they supported Serbian premier Vu#i# and worked heavily to
make sure Hungarians voted for him.
The move to expand the citizenry effectively channels controversy into political
gain. Citizenship is based on national political decisions – even where the
respective national decision is not in line with international standards (contrast the
Nottebohmstandard to Micheletti). When we accept the first step, the rest follows:
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the extension becomes permanent, and legitimate citizenship-specific provisions
will follow the dubious logic of the underlying policy (see the normative argument
here), the public law connection between non-resident citizens and Budapest. This
seems a lot like the debate over how far illiberal policies are to be tolerated in the
EU: while the debates have been keeping busy decision-makers and scholars alike,
the regimes effectively broke the spine of their constitutional democracies. This is
not to downplay the importance of normative debates, on the contrary. We need to
understand the full scope of what is at stake. Legitimate principles of electoral rights
harmonization are invoked in the case of an instrument of power, just as it is the
case with EU funds or EPP membership. Not seeing the full picture2)See, with the
Hungarian example, the case that routines of comparative scholarship might break
down in the context of constitutional degradation: Renáta Uitz, Can you tell when
an illiberal democracy is in the making? An appeal to comparative constitutional
scholarship from Hungary, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 13:1, 279–
300, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov012. plays into the hands of those who have
been playing the game (the ‘peacock dance’) of faking compliance with European
norms for long.
I would like to thank Nándor Bárdi, Balázs Majtényi, and Szabolcs Pogonyi for
comments and suggestions. All errors (systemic or not) are my own.
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